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We investigate how the 2009 regulatory change to the method of calculating 
combined ratios in the Chinese property-casualty insurance industry affected the 
relationship between commissions and combined ratios. We find that since the 2009 
reform, the industry has showed a non-linear relationship between commissions and 
combined ratios. The relationship is negative (positive) when the combined ratio is 
higher (lower) than the regulatory threshold. Before 2009, this relationship was linear. 
Since 2009, when commissions increase the combined ratios converges to the 
threshold. As the volatility of the combined ratio is positively related to the statutory 
capital required, this change provides incentives for insurers to decrease the combined 
ratio and/or its volatility, as they seek to manage their commissions to approximate 
the threshold without jeopardizing the compliance with other regulatory requirements.  
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We study how insurers manage their reported fees and commissions to agents 
(commissions hereafter) in response to the 2009 regulatory change in how the Chinese 
property-casualty (PC) insurance industry calculates the combined ratio. The 
enactments of the “New Enterprise Accounting Code” (NEAC) and the associated 
“New Indicator System Regulation for Statistics Analysis of Insurance Company” 
(NISR), which were directly applied to the insurance industry in 2009, have given 
plausibly exogenous shocks to the financial reporting of combined ratio. This set of 
changes provides an ideal setting to test how the regulatory change affects insurer 
incentives in the management of financial reporting. 
The combined ratio is a key financial indicator for the performance of PC 
insurers, as this ratio reflects the insurers’ underwriting results,1 and it is one of the 
key indicators of an insurer’s financial strength. This indicator is consistently 
monitored by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), which oversees 
the nation’s insurance industry. According to the “Indicator of Insurance Companies’ 
Solvency and Regulatory Requirements” , which was enacted in March 2003, PC 
insurance companies that had two consecutive years of average combined ratios 
higher than 103% were considered problematic. Since 2008, the CIRC has turned its 
regulatory emphasis to ensuring solvency, but the combined ratio is still being 
monitored. Loss ratio and expense ratio, which are the two components of the 
                                                             
1 The combined ratio is the sum of the loss ratio and the expense ratio. The loss ratio is the sum of the total losses 
incurred and the associated adjustment expenses, divided by the premiums earned. The expense ratio is the 
percentage of the premium used to pay all of the costs of acquiring, writing, and servicing insurance and 
reinsurance, including the fees and commissions paid to agents, administration fees, and business taxes or 
surcharges. Both the loss and expense ratios are integral factors in the retrospective rating of basic premiums. 
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combined ratio, must be reported according to the “Property-casualty Insurance 
Companies’ Quarterly Solvency Report Template.” Furthermore, the ratio of actual 
capital to the minimum capital requirement (MCR) must be more than 200%. 
Otherwise, the deficiency will trigger regulatory interventions similar to those 
imposed in the risk-based capital system in the U.S. As the MCR is positively related 
to the volatility of the combined ratio, insurers have strong incentives to smooth their 
combined ratios over years, as a way to reduce the regulatory capital requirements.2 
Commissions paid to agents constitute a significant portion of the costs for PC 
insurance companies in China. These commissions equaled 12% of total expenses in 
2003, but soared to 29% in 2014 for the median insurers, and the increase had a direct 
impact on the insurers’ profits and combined ratios. Among all of the regulatory 
indicators monitored by the CIRC, only the value of commissions appears in the 
calculation of the combined ratio. As is discussed in more detail in the next section, 
commissions can be managed to meet solvency sufficiency requirements and reduce 
the regulatory capital required through the combined ratio, and this kind of managing 
can be done without jeopardizing the compliance with other regulatory requirements. 
In this study, we focus on the effects of the NEAC and the associated NISR regarding 
insurance, since these regulations were applied in 2009. We consider the application 
of these reforms as an exogenous regulatory shock, which we can use to study the 
resulting changes in how insurers conduct strategic reporting on commissions. 
                                                             
2 More specifically, one important factor in determining a firm’s statutory capital is the volatility of the combined 
ratio. The more volatile the combined ratio is, the higher the statutory capital requirement is, according to Kremer 
(1982), Renshaw (1989), Verrall (1989), Zehnwirth (1989), and Yuan (2012). The detailed method of calculation is 
that a lognormal distribution is used to fit the historical data on the combined ratio, and then either the 95% or the 
99% percentile is the factor used to calculate the minimum capital requirement. 
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Previous studies on earnings management in the PC insurance industry have 
mainly investigated how loss reserves are managed to avoid failures in meeting the 
regulators’ requirements concerning solvency or premium rates.3 To the best of our 
knowledge, however, commissions have received no attention in the earnings 
management literature, probably due to the difficulties involved in their manipulation, 
and their relatively smaller magnitude compared to the loss reserves in the U.S. PC 
insurance industry.  
Arguably, loss reserves are easier to be managed than commissions, because loss 
reserves are based on the managers’ subjective forecasts of future losses to be paid.4 
In contrast, commissions are the amounts paid to insurance agents and their 
intermediaries, from which the premiums are received. Therefore, commissions in the 
U.S. insurance industry are not a straightforward channel for managing earnings.  
In China, the situation is quite different. Although it is rarely reported that 
commissions are managed in the U.S. insurance market, it is not uncommon in China. 
According to recent Chinese insurance intermediary market reports, insurance firms 
are frequently found to partner with agents to practice a kind of money laundering 
through the channel of commissions. Chen explains that “36 Insurance Regulatory 
Bureaus dispatched 43 teams to carry out inspections on 103 local business units of 20 
insurers in 2011. ¥80.66 million earned by insurance companies were found to be 
illegal, which were made by faking or exaggerating commissions paid to 
intermediaries and agents. The opaque relationship between insurance companies and 
                                                             
3 Petroni (1992); Petroni and Beasley (1996); Penalva (1998); Petroni et al. (2000); Gaver and Paterson (2004); 
Eckles et al. (2011); Grace and Leverty (2012); Gaver and Paterson (2012); Gaver and Paterson (2014). 
4 Petroni, et al. (2000); Beaver, et al. (2003); Grace and Leverty (2010); Grace and Leverty (2012). 
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intermediaries is considered a serious regulatory challenge in China’s insurance 
market.”5 
Furthermore, commissions have always been among the top three largest items 
on the liability side of the financial statements issued by most Chinese PC insurers, 
even though commissions are normally smaller than loss reserves in terms of 
numerical values. Reserves for unearned premiums, loss reserves, and commissions 
always rank among the top three categories of insurers’ liabilities. In 2003, the totals 
for these three categories were ¥43.18 million (for unearned premiums), ¥25.76 
million(for loss reserves), and ¥2.55 million(for commissions), which accounted for 
34%, 15%, and 3% of total liabilities, respectively.6 A decade later in 2014, the 
largest three categories of liability were loss reserves (¥811.69 million), followed by 
reserves for unearned premiums (¥496.06 million), and then commissions (¥134.54 
million). These categories accounted for 36%, 34%, and 10% of total liabilities, 
respectively.7 The median and the mean of the ratios of commissions to income (i.e., 
the commission ratio) in 2014 were 11.2% and 11.7%, respectively. Although both 
loss reserves and commissions affect the final values of the combined ratio, it is the 
annual difference in the loss reserves (DLR) that is entered in the final calculation of 
the combined ratio. In that calculation, the DLR for year t is equal to the loss reserve 
for year t, minus the loss reserve for year t-1, minus the loss reserve recovered from 
                                                             
5 Chen (2012, p. 25). 
6 In our earlier sample period, the lower value of the ratio of the loss reserves and premium unearned to total 
liabilities is due to the fact that China’s insurance market is a newly developing market. In more recent period, 
these ratios in China are more comparable to those in U.S., e.g., loss reserves represented 38% of total liabilities 
and unearned premiums were 35%, for a total of 73% of total liabilities in 2014. 
7 The data used to calculate the combined ratio, including commissions, all come from the Income Statements. 
Only in the Introduction Section, data from the Balance Sheets are used to illustrate that the ratio of commissions 




reinsurance.8 Taking 2008 as an example, we find that the median of DLR was 
¥117.31 million, which was smaller than that of commissions. The medians of 
commissions and of loss reserves in China’s PC industry (for 2008) were ¥146.91 and 
¥462.59 million, respectively. These numbers were comparable with those of other 
years. Moreover, the median of premium income for 2008 was ¥1.33 billion, of which 
commissions accounted for 11%.9 Thus, commission is the single most important 
factor in calculating the combined ratio in China. 
More importantly, before the enforcement of the NEAC in 2009, there was a 
positive linear relationship between commissions and the combined ratios. As there is 
a regulatory threshold for the combined ratio (i.e., combined ratios larger than 1.03 
are considered unhealthy by regulators), insurers are essentially constrained, and they 
have no incentives to manage commissions. 
However, after the enactment of the NEAC in 2009, we find a non-linear 
relationship between the commissions and the combined ratios. More specifically, 
there is a critical value for the combined ratios (denoted by t  hereafter). Under 
reasonable assumptions, t  equals the regulatory threshold of 1.03. Commissions 
are positively related to the combined ratio when it is lower than t . When the 
combined ratio is higher than the critical value t , the relationship turns negative 
(i.e., the higher the commissions are, the lower the combined ratios will be). 
                                                             
8 The annual difference in the loss reserves (DLR) in our paper is analogous to the item of Loss reserve 
development one year in Schedule P-Part 2-Summary Row 12 Column 11 of the U.S. PC NAIC Annual Statement. 
Ratio 11 of the IRIS system in U.S., the One-year Reserve Development to policyholders’ surplus ratio, also uses 
One-year Reserve Development as the numerator of the ratio. Again, this “development” value enters in the 
calculation of CR in China as illustrated in Table 1 and is proved in proposition 4. 
9 The exchange rates in 2003, 2008 and 2014 are 8.2767, 6.8346 and 6.119, respectively, according to People’s 
Bank of China. 
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Furthermore, the NEAC effectively increases the weight of commissions, which 
influences the combined ratio. As the volatility of the combined ratio is positively 
related to the statutory capital required, insurers can always increase commissions to 
move the combined ratio toward the critical value t  (i.e., meet the regulatory 
requirement and/or reduce the volatility of the combined ratio to reduce regulatory 
capital). 
Although this study focuses on Chinese market, there are two reasons why the 
findings reported here offer insights for other countries. First, these changes of the 
accounting rules in China generally follow the West albeit with some minor 
adjustments, the denominator of the expense ratio (ER) is premiums earned (PE) 
instead of Premiums written (PW). However, it is the adjustments of an accounting 
item in the CR calculation that lead to the non-linear relationship between 
commissions and the combined ratio (CR). More specifically, contingent commissions 
presenting in both numerator and denominator of CR calculation lead to the 
non-linear relationship, distorting the implication of one of the most important 
regulatory ratio. We make a detailed analysis in Section 2 and Section 5. This may 
provide useful experience for the West when setting or adjusting the accounting rules: 
even a tiny change in the accounting rules might lead unexpected regulatory effects.  
Second, since 2016, China’s insurance market has become the second largest one in 
the world, as measured by total premium income. We believe that China’s market is 
attracting increasing interest worldwide. Many insurers have entered or plan to enter 
the Chinese market. These insurers are mostly from Western countries, and they are 
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also subject to regulations in their home countries. This internationalization of the 
insurance business requires the collaboration of insurance regulators from China and 
from Western countries. Such collaboration in turn calls for better understanding of 
the industry practices and regulations that are practiced in China. Therefore, this study 
should be of interest not only to industry participants and regulators in China, but also 
to those from Western countries. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
theoretical analysis. The next section suggests the empirical expectations for 
predicting the behavior of PC insurance companies according to the theoretical 
analysis. Descriptive statistics are then presented, which show that our model is 
generally supported by strong empirical evidence. The next section shows the 
comparative analysis, which decomposes the different effects that the NEAC and the 
NISR have on the relationship between the commissions and the combined ratio. The 
last section offers our conclusions. 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we first conduct a theoretical analysis on the relationship between 
commissions, combined ratios, profits, and loss reserves. Then we determine the 
critical value at which the positive (negative) relationship between commissions and 
the combined ratios turns negative (positive). 
Relationship Analysis 
1. Commissions and Combined Ratios 
The NEAC affects the combined ratio mainly through its changes to the method 
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for calculating unearned premium reserves (UPR) defined as portion of a policy's 
premiums that apply to the expired portion of the policy, which in turn causes changes 
in the calculation of premiums earned defined as portion of the policy premiums that 
have not yet been "earned" by the company because the policy still has some time to 
run before expiration. In the pre-NEAC era, UPR was calculated as a pre-determined 
(actuarially fair) proportion of premiums written. Correspondingly, the premiums 
earned were equal to the premiums written, minus the difference between the two 
adjacent years’ UPR totals. However, the NEAC is more conservative in the way it 
calculates the UPR. More specifically, the UPR is calculated as a pre-determined 
proportion of the adjusted premiums written, from which the policy-acquiring 
expenses (including commissions, operating expenses related to writing policies, 
business tariffs and annexes, contributions to the Insurance Guarantee Fund, 
administration fees, and other miscellaneous expenses) have to be deducted first. The 
NEAC accounting formula thus effectively reduces the UPR, ceteris paribus. Since 
premiums earned are equal to premiums written minus UPR, commission is also 
involved in the calculation of premiums earned. 
The second change to the industry caused by the NEAC involves the calculation 
of the expense ratio, which is a very important component of the combined ratio.10 
For the post-NEAC era, the denominator of the expense ratio changes from premiums 
written to premiums earned, thus the denominator of the combined ratio becomes 
                                                             
10 During our sample period, the means (medians) for the loss ratio and the expense ratio are 0.54 (0.53) and 0.48 
(0.42), respectively. The same values for the US P/C industry over that same period are 0.69 and 0.27 (source: 
iii.org), respectively. Note that the dramatic difference is largely due to the immature insurance market in the 
earlier sample period. Most insurers in China are spending significantly in marketing so as to maintain or acquire 
market share in fast-growing insurance market. 
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premiums earned. Because the calculation of the premiums earned involves the 
commissions, as a result, both the numerator and the denominator of the CR involve 
the commissions. These two changes alter the relationship between the commissions 
and the combined ratios. Table 1 provides a comparison of the methods used in 
calculating the combined ratio and the profit for insurers in the pre- and post-NEAC 
regimes.11 We can see that both the numerator and the denominator involve the 
commissions when calculating the CR. Instead, in the pre-NEAC era, the 
commissions only appear in the numerator of the expense ratio, whose denominator is 
premium written, thus it does not involve the commissions. 
According to Table 1, we derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 1  
(1) In the pre-NEAC era, commissions and the combined ratio were positively 
correlated. 
(2) In the post-NEAC era, a threshold, t , exists for the combined ratio. When 
the combined ratio is less than t , the commissions and the combined ratio are 
positively correlated. When the combined ratio is larger than t , the combined ratio 
is negatively correlated with commissions. Thus, when commissions increase, the 
combined ratio always approaches t . 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
                                                             
11 We use PW defined as the premiums registered on the books of an insurer or a reinsurer at the time a policy is 
issued and paid for for convenience here. We acknowledge that removal of these acquisition expenses affects both 
earned and unearned premiums. The NEAC procedures now require acquisition expenses to be removed from the 
unearned premium prior to being used in determining the earned premium amount (that would be used in 
determining the combined ratio). In the US market, acquisition expenses are removed from the net written 
premium amount prior to differentiation between earned and unearned premiums. Nevertheless, the results are not 
affected whether we use premiums written or net premiums written. The detailed proof is available upon request 
from the authors. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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Proposition 1 implies that in the pre-NEAC era, the higher the commissions were, 
the higher the combined ratio was. However, in the post-NEAC era, the relationship 
between the two variables changes from a linear to a non-linear relationship (as 
shown in Figure 1a). When the combined ratio is less than the threshold t , the 
higher the commissions are, the higher the combined ratio is. However, when the 
combined ratio is higher than the threshold t , the higher the commissions are, the 
lower the combined ratio is. Most importantly, no matter whether the combined ratio 
is higher or lower than the threshold t , the combined ratio always approaches t  
with the increase in commissions. 
Such a change in the relationship between commissions and the combined ratio 
incentivizes PC insurance companies to manage commissions. On one hand, those PC 
insurance companies with combined ratios higher than the critical value t  find that 
their combined ratios can be reduced and converged with t  by increasing their 
commissions. On the other hand, PC insurance companies with combined ratios lower 
than the critical value t  find that their combined ratios can be managed to converge 
with t  by increasing their commissions. In this way, the volatility of the combined 
ratios is decreased, as a means to decrease the minimum capital requirement. 
2. Commissions and Expense Ratios 
As commissions are an important part of the total expenses of PC insurance 





(1) In the pre-NEAC era, commissions and the expense ratio were positively 
correlated. 
(2) In the post-NEAC era, a threshold t  exists for the expense ratio. When the 
expense ratio is less than t , the commissions and expense ratios are positively 
correlated. When the expense ratio is larger than t , it is negatively correlated with 
commissions. Thus, when commissions increase, the expense ratio always approaches 
t . 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
According to Proposition 2, the relationship between commissions and the 
expense ratio, and that between commissions and the combined ratio are exactly the 
same. In the pre-NEAC era, commissions and the expense ratios were positively 
correlated, but in the post-NEAC era, the two factors are non-linearly correlated. In 
other words, now there is a critical value, which is exactly the same as the critical 
value of the combined ratio t . When the expense ratio is lower than the critical 
value t , the commissions and expense ratios are positively correlated. However, 
when the expense ratio is larger than t , the relationship turns negative. Moreover, 
no matter whether the expense ratio is higher or lower than t , when commissions 
increase, the expense ratio converges to t . 
Therefore, the change in the relationship between commissions and expense 
ratios also incentivizes PC insurance companies to manage commissions. According 
to Propositions 1 and 2, now there are two incentives for managing commissions: 
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either to manage the combined ratio, or to manage part of the combined ratio, i.e., the 
expense ratio. 
3. Commissions and Profits 
Commissions also influence profits, because commissions are one of main 
expenses for PC insurance companies. We therefore study the sensitivity of profits to 
commissions. 
Proposition 3 
In both the pre- and post-NEAC era, commissions and profits are negatively and 
linearly correlated. In the post-NEAC era, the sensitivity of profits to commissions is 
less than it was in the pre-NEAC regime. 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
Thus, commissions and profits are always negatively correlated. In the 
post-NEAC era, however, profit is less sensitive to commissions, as the new 
regulations facilitate insurers’ management of combined ratios by using commissions. 
4. Loss Reserves and Combined Ratios 
For the sake of comparison, we carry out similar theoretical analysis on the 
relationship between loss reserves and combined ratios. 
Proposition 4 
In both the pre- and post-NEAC era, loss reserves and combined ratios are 
positively and linearly correlated. 
Detailed proof can be found in Appendix. 
The relationship between loss reserves and combined ratios is the same in both 
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the pre- and post-NEAC era. However, the degree of sensitivity between these factors 
is reduced in the post-NEAC era. Therefore, it is harder to manage combined ratios 
through manipulating loss reserves in the post-NEAC era. 
The Critical Value 
According to Propositions 1 and 2, in the post-NEAC era, the critical value t  
is crucial in determining the non-linear relationship between commissions and the 
combined ratio, or the expense ratio. Also, the size of t  determines the behavior of 
the PC insurance companies. If the value of t  is too large (i.e., much higher than 
the regulatory threshold of 1.03), then it makes no sense to reduce the combined ratio 
or the expense ratio to converge with t  by increasing commissions. However, if the 
value of t  is too small, PC insurance companies have to make large increase in the 
scale of commissions to meet the goal of converging to t , which is difficult to 
implement in practice. 
However, according to Proposition 1, the critical value t  contains the function 
of the commissions of two adjacent years during the post-NEAC era, as shown in the 
proof below. Obviously, it is impossible to obtain the expression for the function of 
the commissions from two adjacent years, and it is only possible to prove the 
existence of the threshold t . We cannot determine the exact, actual numerical value 
either, which impedes the prediction of potential behavior by PC insurance companies 
and prevents further empirical analysis. To estimate the critical value t  and 
facilitate empirical analysis, we introduce the variables of adjusted premium earned 
and adjusted combined ratio. The adjusted premiums earned refers to the original 
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formula of premiums earned minus the term of the UPR in year t-1. That is, adjusted 
premiums earned is equal to the net premiums written in year t , minus the UPR in 
year t. Accordingly, the combined ratio that is calculated by using the adjusted 
premiums earned is called the adjusted combined ratio (shown in Table 1). 
Proposition 5 
The adjusted combined ratio has the same properties as the combined ratio in 
Proposition 1, and its threshold of 
t
1
 corresponds to t . 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
Proposition 5 indicates that in the pre-NEAC era, the adjusted combined ratios 
and the commissions were positively correlated, but in the post-NEAC era the 
relationship turns into non-linear (as shown in Figure 1b). This relationship is 
perfectly consistent with that between commissions and the combined ratio, and the 
threshold of the adjusted combined ratio 
t
1
corresponds to that of the combined ratio
t , with both factors being time variant. It is worth noting that t  is the proportion 
used to calculate the UPR out of the premiums, i.e., ttt PWUPR  . We use the 
adjusted combined ratio instead of the combined ratio to empirically analyze these 
relationships with commissions, because the threshold 
t
1
 is estimable. However, it 
is impossible to determine the exact data on t  and t  for all years. For 




 for all years and all companies. Under realistic 
assumptions regarding the growth rate of premiums, 03.1t  correspondingly. 
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Such an approximation is realistic for three reasons. (1) In practice, t  is usually 
denoted as 1/2 under the straight-line method. (2) Our data sample validates the 
choice of 1/2.12 (3) In the further empirical analysis to follow, we will include the 
robustness tests, with 
t
1
 being altered from 1.8 to 2.2. 
Proposition 6 





, the threshold of the combined ratio 03.1t . The figure of 
1.03 is therefore exactly the regulatory threshold of the CIRC.  
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
According to Propositions 1, 5, and 6, the adjusted combined ratio and the 
combined ratio have a one-to-one correspondence, and the threshold of the adjusted 
combined ratio corresponds to the regulatory upper bound set by the CIRC. 
The altered relationship between the combined ratios and commissions in the 
post-NEAC era provides insurers with incentives to manage commissions, although 
this outcome might be unexpected by regulators. On one hand, PC insurance 
companies with combined ratios higher than the critical value t  may reduce their 
combined ratios, as they seek to meet the regulatory requirement by increasing 
commissions. On the other hand, insurers with combined ratios lower than the critical 
value t  may increase the combined ratio by increasing commissions, thereby 
                                                             
12 In 2003 to 2014, the means of 
t  were 0.44, 0.50, 0.47, 0.52, 0.61, 0.55, 0.51, 0.47, 0.49, 0.47, 0.49, and 0.48, 
respectively. The values of 
t  after 2009 are estimations, because we cannot obtain the exact data of the initial 
expense after 2009. 
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reducing the volatility of the combined ratios across different years, and reducing the 
regulatory capital associated with the minimum solvency requirement.13 
Similarly, according to Propositions 2 and 6, with the increase in commissions, 
the expense ratio always converges to the critical value t . Considering that 
03.1t , and that the expense ratio is generally only half of the combined ratio, we 
note that if the expense ratio is managed to converge to t , then the combined ratio 
must be much higher than the regulatory standards. As a result, it is very unlikely for 
PC insurance companies to manage the expense ratio by managing commissions, 
because managing the expense ratio to t  makes no sense. 
We have already proven that in the post-NEAC era, the critical value for the 
adjusted combined ratio is 
t
1
. Here, we further calculate its corresponding critical 
value in the pre-NEAC era. 
Proposition 7 













, where t  
is defined as the proportion of initial expenses in the premium income, and this 
variable is time variant. 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
                                                             
13 Insurers implicitly have two goals in mind when managing commissions to affect combined ratios in our 
settings. The first objective is to meet the regulatory requirement of combined ratio so as to avoid regulatory 
actions. The second objective is to reduce the regulatory capital. These two goals are not conflicting with each 





According to the theoretical analysis given above, the implementation of the 
NEAC and NISR changed the relationship between commissions and the combined 
ratios, which incentivized PC insurance companies to reduce the combined ratios 
and/or its volatility by managing commissions. Meanwhile, changes in commissions 
also affected profits. Therefore, we categorize PC insurance companies into four 
states, according to their levels of profits and their combined ratios, and we predict 
these firms’ likely behaviors following the 2009 regulatory changes (Table 2). 
For the situation following the enactment of the NEAC, we define profitable 
insurers that are limited by an upper bound t  as being in State 1. Companies in this 
state also have regulatory constraints under certain circumstances. We predict that 
being in State 1 guarantees that increasing the commissions does not cause the 
combined ratio to exceed the regulatory requirement. Insurers in State 1 thus have 
incentives to increase the combined ratio toward the upper bound t , as a way to 
decrease the volatility of the combined ratio over years and to decrease the minimum 
capital requirement, so long as they meet their profit targets.  
In contrast, profitable insurers in State 2 want to keep the combined ratio below 
the regulatory threshold to avoid regulatory intervention. A negative relationship 
between commissions and the combined ratio occurs when the combined ratio is 
higher than the critical value t , and therefore State 2 insurers have strong incentives 
to increase commissions. 
Insurers in State 3 are facing losses, and we postulate that in the post-NEAC era 
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these insurers have no incentives to increase commissions, because any increase in 
commissions aggravates their losses, and they have already met the regulatory 
requirement on the combined ratio.  
In contrast, insurers with losses in State 4 have strong incentives to increase their 
commissions, as a means to decrease their combined ratios to below the regulatory 
threshold. Admittedly, the increase in commissions exacerbates losses. However, in 
the post-NEAC era, the sensitivity of profit to commissions is less than it was in the 
pre-NEAC era. These conditions enhance the managers’ incentives to avoid regulatory 
intervention at the (reduced) cost of exacerbating loss reporting. 
All in all, in the post-NEAC era, PC insurance companies in States 1, 2, and 4 
are likely to decrease their combined ratios and/or its volatility by increasing 
commissions, either to meet the regulatory standards or to decrease their minimum 
capital requirements. However, insurers in State 3 lack the incentive to manage 
commissions, because they have already met the regulatory standards and are already 
operating at a loss.14 
According to Proposition 4, there is no change in the relationship between loss 
reserves and the combined ratios, which are positively correlated in both the pre- and 
post-NEAC eras. Moreover, in the post-NEAC era, the sensitivity of the combined 
                                                             
14 Increased commissions will lead to lower profits, but this will not have a significant impact on attracting 
investors. First, a high level of commissions might signal that insurance companies are increasing their market 
shares through aggressive marketing strategies. This is particular important to potential investors in current 
Chinese insurance market. Second, according to Proposition 3, in the post-NEAC era, profit is less sensitive to the 
changes in commissions, i.e. the decrease in profit due to the increase in commissions is smaller in magnitude. 
Finally, major investors of insurers in China are government agencies and large institutional investors. They are 
financially sophisticated and can arguably look through the vein of commission management. If commission 
management can reduce regulatory costs, mature investors will not care about short-term reported underwriting 
performance. It is plausible that an insurer is more concerned about reducing real regulatory costs than “reported” 
underwriting performance to attract investors. 
21 
 
ratio to loss reserves is lower. As a result, PC insurance companies lack the incentive 
to manage their combined ratios by managing loss reserves. 
It is worth noting that commission management might have also existed before 
2009. However, we argue that commissions are clearly managed more after 2009 than 
they were in the pre-2009 era, and such management is likely to be the direct result of 
a pseudo-exogenous shock, i.e., the enactment of the NEAC and the NISR. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data on the commissions of PC insurance companies during the 2003–2014 
period are used to validate our predictions on company behavior. We start to collect 
data from 2003 because the ISRS (“Indicator System Regulation for Statistics 
Analysis of Insurance Company”), which was the last change in the regulatory system 
before the NEAC, occurred in 2003. The insurance companies chosen for our sample 
have been in constant operation for at least two years, and have had non-negative 
earned premiums. Policy-based agriculture insurance companies are excluded, so the 
final sample includes 55 companies. We drop abnormal values of the adjusted 
combined ratio in both the upper and lower 1% for 2003–2008 and 2009–2014 
respectively.15,16 This leaves us with 357 firm-year observations, among which 107 
happened before the NEAC was enacted. 
We classify companies into four states according to their profits and their 
                                                             
15 Beaver, et al. (2003). 
16 Note that PC insurance companies have formally adopted the NEAC and the associated NISR since 2009. The 
NEAC was issued in 2006 by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, with the Accounting Standards Interpretation (ASI) 
No. 2 being issued in August 2008. However, it was not until Jan. 1, 2009 that “The Implementation of ASI No. 2 
to the Insurance Industry” was issued, which required all insurance companies operating in China to follow the 
new accounting policies. In the same year, NISR (JR/T0047-2009) was issued and enforced by the Insurance 
Technical Committee of National Committee on the Standardization of Finance. 
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combined ratios. More specifically, in following Propositions 1 and 4, we adopt the 
adjusted combined ratio as determined according to the critical value 
t
1
, rather than 
the combined ratio as used in our state classifications. Correspondingly, according to 












We first analyze the descriptive statistics of the overall trend in the commission 
ratio and the loss reserve ratio. We define the commission ratio as commissions 
divided by premiums written, and we present the descriptive statistics in Panel A of 
Table 3. The mean of the commission ratio has increased in the post-NEAC era (mean 
is0.1000) compared to the pre-NEAC era (mean is 0.0677). Statistical tests confirm 
that the mean of the commission ratio has increased in the post-NEAC era, 
significantly at the 1 percent level (t-statistics is -7.1266).  
Panel B of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on the loss reserve ratio, 
with the definition of this term being the DLR divided by net premiums income. We 
do not observe significant differences between the 2003–2008 and 2009–2014 
regimes(t-statistics is 0.1738). 
According to the Panel C of Table 3, the volatility of the adjusted combined ratio 
has decreased in the post-NEAC era (standard deviation is 0.7640) compared to the 
pre-NEAC era (standard deviation is 5.3065). Statistical tests confirm that the 
volatility of the adjusted combined ratio has decreased in the post-NEAC era, 
significantly at the 1 percent level (F-statistics is 48.2395). We also find that the 
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coefficients of variation and skewness of the adjusted combined ratio in 2009-2014 
are significantly smaller than those in 2003-2008, implying adjusted combined ratios 
are less right skewed and more clustered. One potential reason is that the increasing 
commissions of all insurers after the NEAC leads to the relatively reduced adjusted 
combined ratio and its volatility. 
Then we analyze the trend of the commission ratios and the loss reserve ratios of 
PC insurance companies in different states. Figure 2a shows the trend in the medians 





, and %20t . The numbers of firm-year observations in each of the four 
states are 183, 51, 42, and 81, respectively. Between 2003 and 2008, 64, 22, 20, and 
27 observations were in states 1 to 4, respectively. The corresponding numbers 
changed to 119, 29, 22, and 54 in the years between 2009 and 2014, respectively.17 
Obviously, there were major changes around 2009 for firms in States 1, 2, and 4, and 
especially for those in State 1. However, commission ratios remained relatively stable 
after 2009, and the numbers of insurers in State 3 did not show an upward jump in 
2009. 
Figure 2b shows the trends of median loss reserve ratios for insurers in the four 
states. We do not observe jumps in these ratios around 2009, or in other years. 
From the above-given analysis, we can see that PC insurance companies 
generally show an increase in their commission ratios in the post-NEAC era, but the 
loss reserve ratio does not change significantly. More specifically, in the post-NEAC 
                                                             
17 The total numbers of insurers in the four states are 41, 20, 25, 29, respectively, with 21, 12, 13, 15 in 
2003–2008, and 34, 15, 15, 23 in 2009–2014, respectively. 
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era, companies in States 1, 2, and 4 experience obvious jumps in 2009, but this does 
not happen for companies in State 3. Similarly, the loss reserve ratios do not change 
significantly for companies in any of the four states. This set of findings implies that 
in the post-NEAC era, PC insurance companies decrease their combined ratios and/or 
its volatility by increasing their commissions. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
According to the above-described analysis, we find that PC insurance companies 
are able to reduce their combined ratios and/or its volatility by increasing 
commissions in the post-NEAC era. It is noticeable that this behavior is facilitated by 
the enactment of two different supervisory regulations, namely the NEAC (“New 
Enterprise Accounting Code”) and the associated NISR (“New Indicator System 
Regulation for Statistics Analysis of Insurance Company”). In this section, we show 
how the NEAC and the NISR play different roles in changing the behavior of PC 
insurance companies. 
If Only the NEAC Was Enforced, But Not the NISR 
If only the NEAC was enforced, but the NISR was not, then the UPR (unearned 
premium reserve) would have been accrued according to NEAC. However, the 
expense ratio, which is part of the combined ratio, would be calculated according to 
the previous formula (i.e., the denominator of the expense ratio would remain the 
premiums written (PW) rather than the premiums earned (PE)). Based on this scenario, 




If the NISR was not enacted, then during the pre-NEAC era the commissions and 
the combined ratios would have been linearly and positively correlated. However, in 
the post-NEAC era the commissions and the combined ratio would be non-linearly 
correlated. 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
Actually, it can be found in the proof of Proposition 8 that if the NISR was not 
applied, the loss ratio would be the root of the non-linear relationship in the 
post-NEAC era. In other words, since the enactment of NEAC, changes in 
commissions affect not only the expense ratios, but also the loss ratios, and therefore 
changes in commissions affect the combined ratios in a non-linear way. 
If Only the NISR was Enforced, but not the NEAC 
If only the NISR was enforced, but the NEAC was not, then the denominator of 
the expense ratio would be PE, but the UPR would be accrued according to the 
previous accounting code. With this in mind, we make Proposition 9. 
Proposition 9 
If the NEAC was never enforced (in either the pre- or the post-NISR era), then 
the commissions and the combined ratios would be linearly and positively correlated. 
However, in the post-NISR era, the combined ratio would be more sensitive to 
commissions. 
Detailed proof can be found in the Appendix. 
According to Propositions 8 and 9, the key reason for the changes in the 
26 
 
relationships between the commissions and the combined ratios is the enforcement of 
the NEAC. It is the enforcement of NEAC that causes the non-linear relationship 
between commissions and the combined ratios, which incentivizes PC insurance 
companies to manage commissions. Meanwhile, according to Proposition 2, the 
NEAC reduces the sensitivity of profits to commissions, which further facilitates PC 
insurance companies in managing commissions without worrying about the impact on 
profits. Although the enforcement of the NISR does not essentially change the 
relationship between commissions and the combined ratios, it increases the sensitivity 
of the combined ratios to commissions, which provides further incentive and freedom 
for PC insurance companies to manage commissions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The enactment of the NEAC and the NISR changed the relationship between 
commissions and the combined ratios of PC insurance companies, turning this 
relationship from being linear and positive to non-linear. More specifically, in the 
post-NEAC era, if the combined ratio is lower than the critical value t , then the 
commissions and the combined ratios are still positively correlated; however, if the 
combined ratio is higher than the critical value t , then they are negatively 
correlated. Moreover, no matter whether the combined ratio is higher or lower than 
the critical value t , when the commissions increase, the combined ratios always 
converge to the critical value t . 
We further find that under certain realistic assumptions, the critical value t  is 
equal to the regulatory threshold (1.03). This pattern implies that such a non-linear 
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relationship incentivizes PC insurance companies to manage commissions. PC 
insurance companies are able to reduce their combined ratios as long as those ratios 
are larger than the critical value t , no matter whether they are profitable or 
operating at a loss. Those profitable companies that have combined ratios lower than 
t  are able to decrease the volatility of their combined ratios by increasing 
commissions, and thereby reduce the minimum capital requirement. Companies that 
experience losses and have combined ratios lower than t  have already met the 
regulatory requirement, and thus they lack the incentive to manage commissions. 
Based on our comparative analysis, both the NEAC and the NISR contribute to 
the observed changes. The NEAC mainly turns the positive linear relationship 
between commissions and combined ratios into a non-linear relationship, and it 
reduces the sensitivity of commissions to profits. The NISR serves to increase the 
sensitivity of combined ratios to commissions. Both the NEAC and the NISR 
incentivize and facilitate the management of commissions by PC insurance 
companies. 
However, neither the NEAC nor the NISR change the relationship between loss 
reserves and combined ratios, which is always positive. Furthermore, in the 
post-NEAC era the sensitivity of combined ratios to loss reserves is reduced, thereby 
reducing the incentive to manage the combined ratios by managing loss reserves. This 
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Figure 1. Relationship between Commissions and Combined Ratios/Adjusted Combined Ratios 
Figure 1 includes Figures 1a and 1b. In Figure 1a, the relationship between Commissions 
(horizontal axis) and Combined Ratio (vertical axis) is nonlinear, and obviously there is a limit 
t . 
When the Combined Ratio is lower than the critical value 
t , the Commissions and the Combined 
Ratios are still positively correlated, but when the Combined Ratio is higher than the critical value 
t , 
the relationship turns to a negative correlation, i.e., the higher the Commissions, the lower the 
Combined Ratios. 
Figure 1b shows the relationship between Commissions and Adjusted Combined Ratios. The 
horizontal axis is Commissions, and the vertical axis is Adjusted Combined Ratios. The relationship 
between these factors is also nonlinear, and there is a limit at 1/ t . When the Adjusted Combined 
Ratio is lower than the critical value1/ t , the Commissions and the Adjusted Combined Ratios are 
still positively correlated, but when the Adjusted Combined Ratio is higher than the critical value of 
1/ t , the relationship turns to a negative correlation, i.e., the higher the Commissions are, the lower 





























Figure 1b. Relationship between 














Figure 1a. Relationship between 




Figure 2. Trend of the Commission Ratio/Loss Reserve Ratio Relationship 
Figure 2 includes Figures 2a and 2b. Figure 2a shows the trend of the Commission Ratio, with the 
horizontal axis being the year, and the vertical axis being the medians of the Commission Ratios of PC 
insurance companies. Figure 2b shows the trend of the Loss Reserve Ratio, in which the horizontal axis 
has the same meaning, and the vertical axis represents the medians of the Loss Reserve Ratios. The 
States are classified by Profit and by Adjusted Combined Ratio. From 2009 to 2014, when Profit is 
positive and the Adjusted Combined Ratio is lower or higher than the critical value 1/ t , the 
company is in State 1 or State 2. When Profit is negative and the Adjusted Combined Ratio is lower or 
higher than the critical value 1/ t , the company is in State 3 or State 4. From 2003 to 2008, the 










t  is the unearned 
proportion of year t, which is calculated by using the Proportion Approach or the Risk Distribution 
Approach. The variable t  is the proportion of initial expenses in the premium income. Here, 
1/ 2t  , 20%t  , and *—, ○—, ☆—, △— represent companies in States 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2a. Trend of Commission Ratios 
 
Figure 2b. Trend of Loss Reserve Ratios 
























Table 1. Formulae for the Combined Ratio and Other Indicators 
Table 1 includes formulae for both the pre- and post-NEAC eras, including premiums earned, 
Combined Ratios, profits, adjusted premiums earned, Adjusted Combined Ratios, and other variables. 
In the table, tUPR  is the Unearned Premium Reserve of year t. tPE  is the premium earned in year t. 
tCR is the Combined Ratio for year t. tAPE  is the adjusted premium earned in year t. tACR  is the 
Adjusted Combined Ratio for year t. tProfit  is the profit for year t, tPW  is the premiums written in 
year t. 
t  is the unearned proportion of year t, calculated by using the Proportion Approach or the Risk 
Distribution Approach, and with [0,1]t  . tFc  is the commissions for year t. tE is the initial 
expenses for year t, excluding commissions (but including fees related to setting up policies, business 
taxes and surcharges, global reserves, or supervisory expenses). tRM  is the reserves for unearned 
premiums (or risk margins) in year t, which are usually equal to 0. tPC  is Net Paid Claims for year t. 
tDLR is difference in the loss reserve for year t. tE  is all expenses, excluding initial expenses (mainly 
including administration and reinsurance expenses). t t t t t tC PC DLR Fc E E     , i.e., total claim 
payments and expenses. 
 NEACpre   NEACpost   
tUPR  ttPW      ttttt RMEFcPW     








































Table 2. States of PC Insurance Companies 
Table 2 shows the classification of PC insurance companies. We divide these companies into four 
states, according to two dimensions: profit (higher or lower than 0), and CR (the Combined Ratio 
higher or lower than the critical value ). 
   
 : State 1 : State 2 











Table 3. Descriptive Statistics from 2003 to 2014 
Panels A, B and C show the descriptive statistics for the Commission Ratios, the Loss Reserve 
Ratios and the adjusted combined ratio, respectively, from 2003 to 2014. The numbers of samples, the 
means, standard deviations, medians, coefficients of variation (CV), skewness, and maximums and 
minimums of these variables are included in the table. 
Panel A：Descriptive Statistics of Commission Ratios 
 Company Mean Standard 
Deviation   
Median CV Skew Max Min 
2003 20 0.0477 0.0448 0.0456 0.9380 0.7644 0.1590 0.0000 
2004 21 0.0532 0.0318 0.0580 0.5990 0.5681 0.1374 0.0063 
2005 24 0.0578 0.0375 0.0611 0.6489 1.0541 0.1744 0.0087 
2006 20 0.0690 0.0411 0.0670 0.5950 0.3688 0.1689 0.0086 
2007 22 0.0805 0.0391 0.0780 0.4856 0.4016 0.1744 0.0176 
2008 26 0.0924  0.0467  0.0897  0.5049  0.9866  0.2423  0.0096  
2009 30 0.1019 0.0421 0.1006 0.4134 1.2788 0.2579 0.0165 
2010 31 0.0894 0.0355 0.0893 0.3974 0.5585 0.1837 0.0172 
2011 35 0.0893 0.0351 0.0858 0.3935 0.7534 0.1839 0.0179 
2012 38 0.0953 0.0386 0.0903 0.4051 1.5942 0.2483 0.0269 
2013 45 0.1019 0.0405 0.0980 0.3970 1.4844 0.2623 0.0313 
2014 45 0.1167 0.0441 0.1115 0.3777 0.8202 0.2575 0.0375 
03—08 133 0.0677  0.0429  0.0667  0.6339  0.7349  0.2423  0.0000  
09—14 224 0.1000  0.0405  0.0951  0.4044  1.1592  0.2623  0.0165  
Total 357 0.0880  0.0442  0.0878  0.5022  0.7260  0.2623  0.0000  
Panel B：Descriptive Statistics of Loss Reserve Ratios 
 Company Mean Standard 
Deviation   
Median CV Skew Max Min 
2003 20 0.0530 0.0620 0.0412 1.1692 -0.3235 0.1757 -0.1075 
2004 21 0.0658 0.0707 0.0535 1.0740 1.1901 0.2618 -0.0532 
2005 24 0.1026 0.1027 0.0798 1.0009 1.7676 0.4428 -0.0497 
2006 20 0.0745 0.1212 0.0387 1.6268 2.8366 0.5298 -0.0511 
2007 22 0.1318 0.0973 0.1361 0.7387 0.6235 0.3805 -0.0605 
2008 26 0.1060  0.0659  0.0871  0.6212  0.9526  0.2615  0.0023  
2009 30 0.0724 0.1195 0.0717 1.6498 -1.3176 0.2785 -0.3354 
2010 31 0.1431 0.1546 0.1024 1.0808 3.2275 0.8466 -0.0206 
2011 35 0.1290 0.2147 0.0827 1.6645 3.6311 1.1916 -0.0940 
2012 38 0.0910 0.2376 0.0394 2.6092 4.7743 1.4176 -0.1325 
2013 45 0.0721 0.1059 0.0551 1.4689 -0.7055 0.4231 -0.3686 
2014 45 0.0704 0.0763 0.0539 1.0830 1.0592 0.2839 -0.0447 
03—08 133 0.0906  0.0911  0.0721  1.0054  1.7391  0.5298  -0.1075  
09—14 224 0.0883  0.1334  0.0645  1.5102  3.3182  1.1916  -0.3686  
Total 357 0.0892  0.1193  0.0678  1.3374  3.1741  1.1916  -0.3686  
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Panel C：Descriptive Statistics of Adjusted Combined Ratios 
 Company Mean Standard 
Deviation   
Median CV Skew Max Min 
2003 20 1.6583 0.6960 1.4672 0.4197 1.1565 3.3837 0.8514 
2004 21 1.6488 0.6034 1.6374 0.3660 0.477 2.8282 0.8138 
2005 24 2.8377 4.7038 1.9742 1.6576 4.4194 24.6689 0.6370 
2006 20 2.5481 2.5662 2.0595 1.0071 3.6345 13.0206 0.9876 
2007 22 3.2102 2.2535 2.7948 0.7020 2.4555 11.1615 1.1356 
2008 26 6.2065  10.2282  2.8522  1.6480  3.2339  43.7097  0.7844  
2009 30 2.3230 0.9514 2.0744 0.4095 2.2714 5.7657 1.3308 
2010 31 1.8658 0.4805 1.7905 0.2575 0.3253 2.9550 0.7441 
2011 35 2.0972 0.8252 1.8118 0.3935 1.9369 5.1010 1.0923 
2012 38 2.1341 0.8927 1.9103 0.4183 2.9367 6.1997 1.2270 
2013 45 2.1468 0.8765 1.8602 0.4083 2.6864 5.7328 1.3348 
2014 45 2.1219 0.7315 1.8503 0.3448 1.9145 4.7675 1.4174 
03—08 133 3.1493  5.3065  2.1138  1.6850  5.9590  43.7097  0.6370  
09—14 224 2.1013  0.7640  1.8700  0.3636  2.3693  2.3693  0.7441  






Proof of Proposition 1 
(1) According to Table 1, in the pre-NEAC era, 
t t tUPR PW   ， 1 1 1( ) (1 )t t t t t t t tPE PW UPR UPR PW PW         ， 
t t t t t
t
t t














i.e., the combined ratios and the commissions are positively correlated. 
(2) In the post-NEAC era,  
( )t t t t tUPR PW Fc E     , 
1( )t t t tPE PW UPR UPR     
1 1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t tPW Fc E PW Fc E             
1
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( ( ) )t t t t t t t t tPW Fc E PW f Fc E  

          
1( )t tFc f Fc   is a functional relationship between the commissions of year t  
and year 1t  . 
1
1 ( )t tFc f Fc

   is the inverse function.
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          
                                                             
18 Many researchers show that combined ratios and loss ratios have an autocorrelation (Venezian 1985; Cummins 






























Obviously, 0tPE  ， (0,1)t  . 
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, tCR  is monotonically increasing with tFc , i.e., the 
higher the fees and commissions, the higher the combined ratio; 







, tCR  is monotonically decreasing with tFc , i.e., the 
higher the commissions, the lower the combined ratio; 














                                                             
19 In general, if PC insurance companies prepay Fc  more commissions to intermediaries in year t-1, then 









Proof of Proposition 2 




















i.e., the expense ratios and commissions are positively correlated. 


















































































, tER  is monotonically increasing with tFc , i.e., the 
higher the fees and commissions, the higher the expense ratio; 







, tER  is monotonically decreasing with tFc , i.e., the 
higher the commissions, the lower the expense ratio; 
and when tFc , ttER  . 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
According to Table 1, in the pre-NEAC era, 
t t tProfit PE C   









In the post-NEAC era, 
t t tProfit PE C   
 11 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( ( ) )t t t t t t t t t t t t t tPW Fc E PW f Fc E PC DLR Fc E E  

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i.e., in the post-NEAC era, profits and commissions are still negatively and linearly 




Proof of Proposition 4 
According to Table 1, in the pre-NEAC era, 
t t t t t
t
t t













In the post-NEAC era, 
t t t t t
t
t
PC DLR Fc E E
CR
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Therefore, in both the pre- and the post-NEAC eras, loss reserves and combined ratios 
are positively and linearly correlated. However, in the post-NEAC era, the premiums 
earned, tPE , increases, i.e., the sensitivity of the combined ratios to loss reserves 
decreases, due to the initial expenses such as commissions. 
It is worth noting that premiums written and premiums earned are not affected by the 
DLR. Premiums earned is only affected by the UPR, and premiums written is not 




Proof of Proposition 5 
(1) According to Table 1, in the pre-NEAC era, 
(1 )t t t t tAPE PW UPR PW     ，
t t t t t
t
t t














i.e., the adjusted combined ratios and commissions are positively and linearly 
correlated. 
(2) In the post-NEAC era,  
(1 ) ( )t t t t t t t tAPE PW UPR PW Fc E       ， 
t t t t t t
t
t t
PC DLR Fc E E C
ACR
APE APE
   
  ， 
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, tACR  is monotonically increasing with tFc , i.e., the 















, tACR  is monotonically decreasing with tFc , i.e., the 
higher the commissions, the lower the combined ratio;  












  1 1 1
( )1 t t t t
t t t t t t
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1 1 1( )1 1lim lim
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t t t t
Fc Fc
t t t t t t t
PW Fc E
CR ACR PC DLR Fc E E
  
 
   
   
    
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 , when tFc ,
1
1 ( )t tFc f Fc

    . 
According to L’Hospital’s rule, 
1
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ( ) )lim lim
t t
t t t t t t t t
Fc Fc
t t t t t t t t t t
PW Fc E PW f Fc E
PC DLR Fc E E PC DLR Fc E E
     
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        
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
              (ⅱ) 
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 , ttCR  , 
i.e., the threshold of the adjusted combined ratio 
1
t
 and that of the combined ratio 




Proof of Proposition 6 





























































































Proof of Proposition 7 
We denote the adjusted combined ratios in the pre- and post-NEAC eras as oldtACR  




























































Proof of Proposition 8 


























In the post-NEAC era,  1 tttt UPRUPRPWPE , 












































 ，i.e., Loss Ratio 














, tCR  is monotonically increasing with tFc , 














， tCR  is monotonically decreasing with tFc , 




Proof of Proposition 9 
If NEAC had not been implemented, then 
 1 tttt UPRUPRPWPE ， ttt PWUPR   

















































Therefore, if NEAC had not been implemented (in either the pre- or the 
post-NISR era), then the commissions and the combined ratios would be linearly and 
positively correlated. However, in the post-NISR era, the combined ratios would be 
more sensitive to commissions. 
